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  We develop a simple and intuitive approach for analytically deriving 
unconditionally optimal (UO) policies, a topic of enduring interest in optimal 
monetary policy analysis. The approach can be employed to both general 
linear-quadratic problems and to the underlying non-linear environments. We 
provide a detailed example using a canonical New Keynesian framework. 
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 1. Introduction
In this paper we take up a theme from Taylor (1979), who proposes adopting
a monetary policy, under rational expectations, which is optimal "on average".
That is, given a model of the economy, including knowledge of the time series
properties of the underlying shocks, and assuming rational expectations, Taylor
proposes that optimal monetary policy optimize the unconditional expectation
of the policymaker￿ s objective function. That approach to policy evaluation has
been adopted many times since; for example, Rotemberg and Woodford (1998),
Woodford (1999), Clarida, Gali and Getler (1999), Erceg, Henderson and Levin
(2000), Kollman (2002) and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007), to name but a few.
More recently, Blake (2001) and Jensen and McCallum (2002, 2006) also suggest
a procedure for determining optimal, time-invariant monetary policy based on
optimization of the unconditional value of the criterion function. However, these
analyses employ numerical approaches to recover the unconditionally optimal
monetary policy. An exception to that is Whiteman (1986). In a simple linear,
rational expectations model with endogenous variables which are partly a function
of their own expected future values, he derives a closed-form solution for optimal
policy. However, Whiteman￿ s proof of optimality is algebraically intensive.
In this paper we devise a straightforward, intuitive and easy-to-implement
approach to deriving policies that are unconditionally optimal in a general setting
which we lay out in Section 2. The key technical challenge involves constructing
an optimal policy program taking expectations over all feasible initial conditions.
In Section 2.1 we derive these optimal continuation policies, to use Jensen and
McCallum￿ s terminology, in a way that is applicable to both linear-quadratic (LQ)
and non-linear models. In Section 2.2 we demonstrate the approach in the simplest
LQ New Keynesian monetary policy model (whilst a general LQ problem is set
2out in the appendix). In Section 3 we then apply the approach to the underlying
non-linear New Keynesian model. We show that linear approximation is possible
around the "unconditionally optimal" deterministic steady state, analogous to
the approach adopted by Khan, King and Wolman (2003) in the context of
(conditionally) optimal monetary policy under commitment. We linearize the
optimality conditions of the non-linear model and indicate how one can obtain a
LQ framework and the same optimal policy as the simple LQ set-up of Section
2.2.
In Section 4, we discuss brie￿ y the two de￿ning characteristics of
unconditionally optimal policies. The ￿rst issue is the treatment of initial
conditions. The second is the sense in which consumers￿discount rates do not
matter for unconditionally optimal policies, an observation going back to Taylor￿ s
(1979) contribution. We conclude in Section 5.
2. The framework
Consider a discounted loss function of the form





where Et is the expectations operator conditional on information up through date
t, ￿ is the time discount factor, l(xt+j;￿t+j) is the period loss function and xt is









Zt is a vector of predetermined endogenous variables (lags of variables that are
included in zt and it), zt is a vector of non-predetermined endogenous variables, the
value of which may depend upon both policy actions and exogenous disturbances
3at date t, and it is a vector of policy instruments, the value of which is chosen in
period t. ￿t denotes a vector of exogenous disturbances. We will assume that ￿t
is a function of primary i.i.d. shocks, (ei)
t
￿1 :
We further assume that the evolution of the endogenous variables zt and Zt is
determined by a system of simultaneous equations
F (Etxt+1;xt;￿t) = 0: (2.2)
We assume that the policy maker minimizes the unconditional expectation of the
loss function (2.1) subject to constraint (2.2). That is he searches for a policy rule
’(Zt+1;Etzt+1;Zt;zt;it;￿t) = 0 (2.3)
such that
’ = argminELt(’); (2.4)
where E denotes the unconditional expectations operator. We call such a policy
"Unconditionally Optimal" and denote it ￿ UO-policy￿ .
2.1. Solution
Formally, the unconditional expectation of any function u(x) can be represented




where de is the Cartesian product probability measure of i.i.d. primary shocks
with history, (det￿k)
1
k=0 : We emphasize that de is given exogenously and does not
change with policy. To optimize the integral we need to optimize the corresponding
Hamiltonian, which is the expression under the integral, ut(xt(’;e)). Intuitively
this is plausible as the policy which minimizes a loss function in every state of
nature (the components of the sum), will also minimize the expectation (i.e., the
4sum or integral). With these observations in mind, we employ standard methods
of stochastic Lagrange multipliers to solve for unconditionally optimal policy:


















￿ Step 2: Using the property of unconditional expectations, such that Eyt =
Eyt+j; re-formulate this as
J = E [l(xt;￿t) + ￿tF (Etxt+1;xt;￿t)];
which corresponds to the Hamiltonian
H = l(xt;￿t) + ￿tF (Etxt+1;xt;￿t):
￿ Step 3: Write the necessary ￿rst-order conditions for the unconditionally
















The necessary conditions for the optimality of policy ’ is that it implies this
path for the endogenous variables, xt; and that there exists Lagrange multipliers,
￿t; that together satisfy the ￿rst order conditions (2.5) and constraints (2.2).2
1In order to reduce notation when we write ￿F we refer to the tensor product,
Pn
i=1 ￿iFi:
2Step 3 may require further explanation. To obtain it we introduce a new set of variables
yt = Etxt+1: Then the Lagrangian can be written as
J1 = E [l(xt;￿t) + ￿tF (yt;xt;￿t) + ￿t(yt ￿ Etxt+1)];
= E
￿
l(xt;￿t) + ￿tF (yt;xt;￿t) + ￿tyt ￿ ￿t￿1xt
￿
:
The corresponding Hamiltonian will be
H1 = l(xt;￿t) + ￿tF (yt;xt;￿t) + ￿tyt ￿ ￿t￿1xt:
5We now provide an example of this approach in a very simple LQ New
Keynesian model. This is a useful example, however, because the simplicity of
the model notwithstanding, analytical derivations of UO policy have not been
presented so far.
2.2. Linear-Quadratic Example3
We search for an unconditionally optimal policy given the loss function,














and the Phillips Curve
￿t = ￿Et￿t+1 + ￿yt + ￿t: (2.7)
Here ￿t denotes in￿ ation, yt is a measure of the output gap and ￿t is a cost-push
shock. Following the above steps, we formulate the unconditional Lagrangian:





















+ ￿t (￿t ￿ ￿yt ￿ ￿t) ￿ ￿￿t￿t￿1
￿
:








+ ￿t (￿t ￿ ￿yt ￿ ￿t) ￿ ￿￿t￿t￿1:






+ ￿tF0 (yt;xt;￿t) ￿ ￿t￿1 = 0; (F1.1)
@H1
@yt
= ￿tF0 (yt;xt;￿t) + ￿t = 0: (F1.2)
Combining (F1.1) and (F1.2) we receive the ￿rst order conditions (2.5).
3The extension to general LQ problems is set out in the Appendix.




(￿yt + ￿yt￿1): (2.8)
This is the unconditionally optimal program proposed by Blake-Jensen-McCallum
and proved to be unconditionally optimal by Whiteman (1986).
3. Non-linear Application4
The model of Section 2.2 represents an approximation to an underlying, non-linear
model. However, some researchers, such as Khan, King and Wolman (2003), prefer
to solve a non-linear Ramsey problem and analyze the resulting linearized ￿rst-
order conditions. In this section we solve for the UO monetary policy of the
non-linear model underlying the set-up of Section 2.2. For an appropriate choice
of steady state, around which linearization of the ￿rst-order necessary conditions
takes place, we derive the same optimal policy as in Section 2.2. We also recover
a LQ formulation of the model.
In terms of the framework of Section 2, to ￿nd a ￿rst order approximation
to unconditionally optimal policy one log-linearizes the system of ￿rst order
conditions (2.5) and constraints (2.2) around the deterministic steady state (X;￿)
de￿ned by the system (3.1):










where X, ￿ and ￿ indicate the vectors of steady state values of endogenous
variables, Lagrange multipliers and the average value of shocks, respectively. We
refer to (X;￿) as the "optimal steady state".
4We thank the editor for encouraging us to undertake the analysis in this section.
7We can easily derive the ￿rst order approximation to (2.5) in the neighborhood
of (3.1):
F (Etxt+1;xt;￿t) = X
@F
@xt
b xt + X
@F
@Etxt+1
Etb xt+1 + ￿
@F
@￿t







b xt + ￿
@2l
@xt@￿t
b ￿t + ￿
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b xt + X
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where O2 denotes terms of order two, or higher.
3.1. The Model
We now provide a concrete example of this approach. The model can be very
brie￿ y laid out as it is developed at length in Woodford (2002) and Damjanovic




where Yt is consumption de￿ned over a basket of goods of measure one and indexed







; ￿ is the
time discount rate; Nt is labour with v > 0. Labour is not ￿rm-speci￿c. The





Yt; where pt(i) is the nominal






: ￿t represents in￿ ation and ￿ is the Calvo parameter and








di. Firms are monopolistic competitors who produce their
distinctive goods according to the following technology, Yt(i) = At [Nt(i)]
1=￿ ;
where At is a productivity shifter and ￿ > 1: It follows that the total amount
















Finally ￿t is a stochastic cost-push shock where ￿ ￿ E(￿t). Parameter ￿ is the
wage tax rate and we de￿ne ￿ := ￿￿1
￿
1￿￿
￿ : So, we are allowing for labour market
subsidies. The model can be reduced to three equations: The representative




























































Before proceeding, we need to rewrite the pricing equation (3.4) in canonical









and rewrite the price-setting equation (3.4) as



























































+E￿t (￿Xt + 1) + E￿￿￿t￿1￿
￿￿1
















































where ￿t; ￿t; and ￿t are multipliers for constraints (3.5), and system (3.6).




























































































































































The optimal policy rule should solve system ￿ := f(3:5);(3:6) and (3:8)g.
3.2. Optimal linear policy and the choice of steady state
We can verify that there is a unique steady state which solves system
f(3:5);(3:6) and (3:8)g for any given level of tax, ￿: However price stability, ￿ = 1,
will be optimal steady state policy if and only if the level of subsidies is optimal:
￿ = 1, and ￿ = 1 ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿1 < 1: Otherwise, the optimal deterministic steady-state
policy would imply a trend in in￿ ation. Log linearization of the model around
trend in￿ ation is straightforward but rather messy (For example see Damjanovic
and Nolan, 2006). In order to keep things uncluttered, we will consider the case
when price stability is optimal. That implies ￿ = 1; ￿ = 1; and X = 1
1￿￿￿: The
steady state value of output corresponds to ￿￿(Y=A)
(v+1)￿ = 1: The steady state
values of the Lagrange multipliers, using (3:8), are ￿ = 0, ￿ = ￿ 1
(1￿￿)￿; and ￿ = 0:
Further, following conventional notation we de￿ne b yt := log(Yt=Y ) ￿
10log(At=A); b ￿t := log￿t; c Xt := log(Xt+1=X); b ￿t := log(￿t=￿); b ￿t := log(￿t=￿).
We de￿ne b ￿t := log(1 + ￿t); b ￿t := log(1 + ￿t); which implies that up to second
order ￿t := b ￿t + O2; ￿t := b ￿t + O2.
The linearization of the Phillips curve and law of motion of prices yields
b Xt = Et￿￿
￿
(￿ ￿ 1)b ￿t+1 + b Xt+1
￿
+ O2;
b yt + ￿c ￿t = Et
1
1 ￿ ￿￿




[b ￿t ￿ ￿b ￿t+1] ￿
1
(v + 1)￿
b ￿ + O2;
c ￿t = ￿[ ￿t￿1 + O2;





= b yt ￿b ￿t + O2 = 0;
@H
@￿t




b ￿t ￿ ￿
￿















(￿￿ + ￿￿ + 1)
1 ￿ ￿￿
￿
b ￿t ￿ ￿b ￿t￿1
￿
+












(￿b yt + ￿b yt￿1): (3.9)
Thus, for this particular assumption about subsidies, the non-linear problem
can be easily nested to the earlier LQ example considered in Section 2.2. The






























and the second order approximation to the law of motion of price dispersion is





￿￿(￿￿ + 1 ￿ ￿)b ￿
2
t + O3: (3.10)
11This implies that the expectation of price dispersion is a second order variable:
Ec ￿t = E 1
2
￿
(1￿￿)2￿￿(￿￿ + 1 ￿ ￿)b ￿
2
t: Therefore, in the case of optimal subsidies the
maximization of the unconditional expectation of (3.3), subject to (3.4) and (3.5)





and ￿ := 1￿￿
￿ (1 ￿ ￿￿)
(v+1)￿
1￿￿+￿￿: We conclude that solution (3.9) is the same as (2.8).
4. Discussion
Two distinguishing attributes of UO policies are worth commenting on brie￿ y.
The ￿rst issue is how UO policies deal with initial conditions; and the second
issue concerns the impact of discounting.
4.1. The distribution of initial conditions
A key attribute of unconditionally optimal (monetary) policy is how it takes
account of the initial conditions that face current and future policymakers. In
a sense, one can think of UO policy as internalizing the distribution of initial
conditions. And even when models lack ￿ jump variables￿ the UO policy still
impacts on the distribution of initial conditions. To see this, note that the
discounted loss function, Lt(￿), very generally depends upon two factors, initial
conditions, Xt￿1; and the policy adopted by the government P; Lt(Xt￿1;P): The
conditionally optimal policy minimizes the loss function
Pc = argminLt(Xt￿1;P);
taking the initial conditions as given. In models without jump variables the
same policy will generally be optimal for all initial conditions, (see Walsh 2003).
However, the initial conditions depend on the policy of predecessors as well as on
the shocks: Xt￿1 = X (P;et￿); where et￿ := fet￿kg
1
k=0 is the history of primary
shocks. For any particular history of shocks, there will generally be a policy which,
12had the previous policymaker adopted it, would have bequeathed its successor with
better (indeed, the best) initial conditions. That is,
Pe (et￿) = argminLt(Xt￿1 (P;et￿);P): (4.1)
The choice of this policy will depend on the realization of the shock. Since (et￿)
is stochastic, the policymaker will generally wish to revise its policy each period.
The unconditionally optimal policy minimizes the loss function (4.1) "on average"




4.2. Invariance with respect to the social discount rate
Taylor (1979, p.1278-9) suggests that an in￿nite horizon perspective with no
discounting may be hallmarks of optimal (time consistent) policy. That may
be contentious (in models with forward-looking constraints, at any rate), but the
sense in which discounting is irrelevant is not fully spelled out. However, we can
establish that the choice of social discount rate is, in a sense, irrelevant from the
perspective of unconditional optimality. Hence, we attribute this proposition to
Taylor:
Proposition 4.1. (Taylor, 1979) The time preference parameter in loss function
(2.1) is not important for the UO policymaker. That is, the best UO policy







j=0 ￿j = ￿ < 1:




Here, lt denotes the period loss function.
13Proof. It follows immediately that,
argmin
’0




￿jElt (’) = argmin
’0
￿Elt (’)
Hence, we have proved that the same policy is unconditionally optimal for any
time invariant discounting.
Proposition (4.1) is interesting as it demonstrates that the same policy is
unconditionally optimal for all households, regardless of their individual time
discount factors. For example, if we assume that the time discount rate does
not depend on current welfare, the unconditionally optimal policy would not
depend on the time-discounting function. Further, we may consider an overlapping
generations economy, or economy with hyperbolic time discounting, or any
time and condition invariant mixture of economic agents with di⁄erent time
discounting. The ￿ best-on-average￿criterion avoids the need for one to take a
stand on what is the appropriate social discount rate; see the discussions of these
issues in Barro (1999) and Somers (1971). Of course, this issue was famously
raised by Ramsey (1928).
5. Conclusion
The simple procedure we have presented for uncovering UO policies appears to
be useful in a wide variety of environments of practical interest to researchers.
An interesting and important question is whether actual monetary (and other)
policies are, or should be, optimal from the unconditional perspective.
14Appendix: Unconditional optimization for a general LQ problem























e Axt+j ￿ e Ixt+j+1
￿￿
:
x￿ is a vector of target values which could depend on disturbance terms,
and Q is a symmetric, positive de￿nite matrix. xt is de￿ned as in the main
text. The evolution of the endogenous variables zt and Zt is determined by






















and ￿t is a vector of exogenous disturbances,
all mean zero.
￿ Step 2: Re-formulate this as an unconditional Lagrangian:
J = EJt:







































￿ Step 3: Write the ￿rst-order conditions for the optimal policy with respect










0 Q + ￿
0









0 Q + ￿
0
t e At ￿ ￿
0
t￿1e I = 0:
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